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Abstract. The usefulness of verification hinges on the quality of the
verification model. Verification is useful if it increases our confidence
that an artefact bahaves as expected. As modelling inherently contains
non-formal elements, the quality of models cannot be captured by purely
formal means. Still, we argue that modelling is not an act of irrationalism
and unpredictable geniality, but follows rational arguments, that often
remain implicit. In this paper we try to identify the tacit rationalism in
the model construction as performed by most people doing modelling for
verification. By explicating the different phases, arguments, and design
decisions in the model construction, we try to develop guidelines that
help to improve the process of model construction and the quality of
models.
1 Introduction
Computer aided verification is a success story. Many years of fruitful work went
into sophisticated algorithms, data structures and tools; the size of (automat-
ically) verifiable problems is increasing; new classes of verifiable problems are
being found; and also hardware progress allows to deal with larger and larger
systems. Many cases have demonstrated the usefulness or potential usefulness of
computer aided verification.
In the end, however, we are not interested in the properties of a model, but in
the correct behaviour of artefacts in physical reality, represented by the bottom
line in figure 1. (Computer aided) verification consists in analysis of formal de-
scriptions of mathematical models of such artefacts, represented by the top line
in figure 1. Our initial question is therefore: To what extent increases verification
our confidence that the artefact behaves in the desired way? By verification we
mean, of course, verification of mathematical model against some property.
There are two immediate answers to this question, reflecting two different
positions, the rationalist’s and the engineer’s position. The rationalist answer
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Fig. 1. Objects relevant in the context of verification
is: formal verification cannot guarantee that an artefact has a certain behaviour
in physical reality; verification can only be used as a debugging technique. The
engineering position is: the quality of the result from verification is as high as
the quality of the model that went into verification.
In this paper, we elaborate the engineering point of view, with the goal to
improve both, the quality of models and the modelling process, and the inter-
pretation of verification results.
Modelling cannot be a purely formal process, as it bridges between an object
of the physical world, (in our case an embedded systems, or artefact) and an
object in the mathematical world, the model (see also figure 1). In the tradition
of Popper a sharp distinction is made between two phases in scientific research,
the context of discovery and the context of justification. Only the justification of
knowledge can be formalised, and is therefore the objective and rational part.
The construction of a model, on the other hand, involves non-formal elements and
requires creativity. This is considered the domain of psychology. We, however,
argue that even if the modelling process cannot be formalised this does not imply
that it is irrational. The distinction above does not conceive the way models are
constructed. From the engineering point of view, construction and design is to
a large extent educated creativity. By this we mean that construction in the
first place is not a process of unpredictable geniality, but follows a discipline of
thinking, proven standard-arguments and steps. In most cases, modelling is not
subject to radical design, where something entirely new is created, but we apply
the known, adequate abstractions, decompositions, idealisations and patterns
([20, 3, 7]). It is the context of discovery that we want to investigate, but in
order to emphasize the rationality present in this process, we prefer to call it
context of construction.
Our intention is to identify the tacit rationalism as applied by most people
doing modelling for verification. By explicating the different phases, arguments,
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and design decisions in the model construction, we try to develop guidelines that
help to improve the process of model construction and the quality of models.
Accordingly, we do not claim that our method should replace existing modelling
methods, languages, and tools, that concentrate mainly at formal and formal-
isable aspects. We believe that systematic attention to and documentation of
non-formalisable but rational aspects add value to the reader’s favourite formal
modelling techniques. We also believe that the method elements presented here
help not to get lost in details, but to construct models that contain not more
information than it is enough for the verification of the desired properties.
We consider an embedded system as a given. Therefore, an important differ-
ence to common engineering design is that the verification model is constructed
after the design of the artefact. The designer of the artefact has taken a number
of design decisions, and our modelling process can follow these.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Related work is contained in sec-
tion 2. In section 3 we propose a taxonomy of decisions for model construction.
This taxonomy is based upon general aspects of models that are specified for
verification models. Section 4 suggests a way of organising and structuring the
arguments and decisions that are taken, leading to a formal description of an
artefact. We conclude with section 5.
2 Related work.
A lot of work has been done around formalising the first steps of the water-
fall model of software engineering [17]. Requirements analysis (see e.g. [16], [8])
starts from more or less vague ideas, deals with misconceptions and conflicting
stakeholders’ wishes, and aims at a formal conceptual model of the application
domain. Construction models can be developed systematically (see e.g. [12], [21])
and formalised in a number of well-defined formal languages (e.g. TLA+ [13]) or
graphical notations (e.g. Statecharts [11]). More general and related principles
of design are discussed in, e.g., [4, 19]. The resulting models, however, which aim
to be complete, can be too complex for present day verification tools.
This is why we focus on verification models: models that contain just enough
to verify certain properties but are much smaller than complete construction
models. For them we have in principle the same list of quality aspects as they
are in the list of attributes of a well-written software requirementspecification
[5].
Verification models should, of course, be derived from conceptual domain
models and construction models, but even if these are available at all, one can
easily get lost in their many details. Therefore, we need a systematic way to
derive a minimal model w.r.t. a verification problem - either from a construction
model or, more realistic, from implicit knowledge and informal diagrams about
an existing artefact.
Many papers on formal methods describe successful verification on the basis
of such verification models. But these usually concentrate on the formal part of
the story and pay less attention to model construction and quality.
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Many papers explain a method w.r.t. a specific modelling language. We try
to be language- and tool-independent. The method proposed in section 4 can be
used in combination with any specification formalism that allows to deal with
assumptions and commitments and to prove that a model satisfies a property.
To emphasise this, we shall not give formal examples but hope that the reader
can follow the running example given in natural language and convert it to her
favourite formalism.
The engineering position on design can be found in [18, 20, 7]. In [4] design
within computer science, following the engineering position, is elaborated. The
construction of verification models shares many aspects with these. The differ-
ence is mainly contained in the requirement for small models and in the fact
that in the context here, we follow the design of the artefact for the design of
the model.
In [6] the construction of verification models for hybrid systems is investi-
gated. The relevant questions to answer for modelling of hybrid systems can be
mapped directly to our taxonomy of design decisons, which is more general.
3 A taxonomy of decisions for model construction.
When, during modelling, assumptions and the non-formal decisions are made
explicit, they can be discussed and questioned, and the results of verification
can be better interpreted. This should increase the quality of models—even if
the number of non-formal decisions might be too large to make them all explicit
and accordingly we never can be sure to have a “correct” model.
In this section we propose a taxonomy of modelling decisions. It can be used
as a checklist, which decisions have to be made explicit. Note, that the classes
identified are not orthogonal, but mutually related.
A number of decisions that define and constrain the verification model have
to be taken prior to the actual model construction. Many of these can only be
approximative and have to be refined during the actual model construction, when
the necessary knowledge about what is given and what is needed can be matched.
The structure and organisation of the decisions during model constructions is
subject of section 4.
What is the object of modelling? Our object of modelling, the embedded
system, consists of a control part and a physical part, which without loss of
generality we shall call plant. We reserve the term environment for everything
that is not object of modelling.
When the interaction of control and physical part is essential for the prop-
erties to be verified, we must model them both. But not in full depth. If, for
example, we assume that the controller’s hardware and operating system behave
correctly, we do not need to model circuit and o.s. code. When we assume that
the engineers have done their work properly, we can take the blueprint of the
plant as basis for a model instead of modelling all nuts and bouts. Also, we may
restrict the breadth of modelling to a well-chosen fragment of the system.
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The specific choice will depend on the properties to be verified, viz. on the
purpose of a model, to be discussed below. The method we propose in 4 should
help to take these decisions at the right moment and also to decide which as-
sumptions about the environment are needed.
The environment cares for too many things to be modelled altogether beforehand—
think of gravity, temperature, humidity, power supply. But during a systematic
modelling proces, starting from a property to be verified, we might find that the
right temperature is essential. Likewise, gravity may be essential when we model
the flow of liquid from one container to another.
What is the purpose of the model? The purpose of a verification model is
verification of some properties only, in contrast to, e.g., specification and design
models, which have to cover more. For a coffee machine, for example, we might
use different models for timing aspects, such as the time distance between two
cups of coffee is not less than 20 seconds, and for quality aspects, such as there
will never be soup powder in the coffee.
Specific for embedded systems is the interdisciplinary character of the knowl-
edge involved. Therefore, an additional purpose of models of embedded systems
is knowledge integration. Typically, the physical part of embedded systems is
built and understood by domain specialists, other than software engineers, as,
e.g., chemical engineers, mechatronics experts, and process engineers. During
modelling the relevant knowledge of these experts has to be identified and trans-
formed into the model. One of our examples here is a valve in a chemical plant,
opened and closed by a controller. How a valve is working precisely, and what
effect the behaviour of the valve has on the quantities flowing through a pipe,
and what this means for the chemical process, is typically knowledge beyond
the scope of a modeller. The modeller learns from a domain expert about the
embedded system under consideration, but only when fixing the knowledge in
form of a model the domain experts can identify misunderstandings, or, often,
lacking domain paradigms. In this process the model has also the purpose of
knowledge communication and transfer. This forms a contrast to many other
models that take only one perspective on a system. When modelling embedded
systems, we therefore have to be aware of this purpose.
The decisions that have to be made explicit here belong to the domain knowl-
edge of the engineers. These decisions become mainly relevant during the model
construction phase: there, we typically detect that for a further step more knowl-
edge is necessary.
Other purposes of a model are maintainability and evolvability, meaning that
small changes in the artefact can be transformed efficiently into the model. These
have to be supported by the modelling process.
What is the pragmatics of the model? How much may it cost to make
the model? Can we throw it away immediately, or at the end of the week? If
we must keep it for a while, must it be maintained? How long is it going to be
maintained, by whom, and what is that allowed to cost?
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What are the epistomological criteria of the model? The model has
different purposes and in order to meet this purpose we have to specify certain
epistomological criteria.
We can identify different epistomological criteria (quality criteria) for veri-
fication models. In the list below we explain them and discuss possibilities for
their evaluation. Some of them may be contradicting in many settings, e.g., sim-
plicity and completeness. When constructing a model we have to decide which
criteria should be satisfied, and be aware of the consequences of criteria not
being satisfied. When using the model for verification of other properties it has
to be checked whether the same epistomological criteria are relevant as for the
initial verification problem.
For verification models we have in principle the same list of quality aspects
as they are in the list of attributes of a well-written software requirement speci-
fication [5].
The criteria discussed here come to some extent directly from the require-
ments for the verification, to some extent from requirements of the model con-
struction process, which should be efficient and reusable (evolvable).
– Truthful. Considering our initial question, this is the most obvious quality
criterium. The model has to represent the relevant behaviour of the arte-
fact. Coming back to the rationalist view on modelling, we only can falsify
models by, e.g., testing. This is reflected in the typical process of model con-
struction, where the first runs of, e.g., a model checker have the purpose
of improving the model and removing bugs, rather than proving something
about the system. Our main claim is that by making modelling decisions ex-
plicit, and break it down in simple steps that support insight, we can increase
truthfulness of the model4.
– Complete. Here, completeness is always relative to a property. Deciding
wheter a model is complete is in most cases as difficult as the evaluation of
truthfulness.
– Simple. Simplicity is crucial for computer aided verification: if a model is too
large we get stuck in a state space explosion. It is easy to decide whether a
model is simply enough, by trying it out on a verification tool. Considering
the rapid development in tools and in hardware, this aspect is a moving
target.
– Understandable. It should be clear which design decisions went into the
model derivation, where they were taken, and what are the consequences,
including, ideally, what are the faults that are avoided. Understandability
can be evaluated by showing the model derivation steps to another person
and find out whether she understands the steps taken.
– Tracable. Tracability has two different interpretations, going in different
directions between artefact and model. The first leads from the model to the
artefact: a fault found in the model should be easily traced back to a fault in
4 According to T. Hoare: There are two ways of constructing a software design. One
way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies. And the other
way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies.
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the artefact. The second interpretation leads from the artefact to the model:
it should be obvious what elements of the artefact went into which design
decision and are reflected at which point in the model.
– Efficiently constructable and maintainable. This is a quality criterium that
is about the modelling process and not the model. However, it is obvious
that it is to some extent a result from the two previous quality criteria,
understandability and tracability. Evaluation of this criterium can only be
performed in pactise.
What is the structure that we want to model? One of the most relevant
approaches to modelling is decomposition. A prerequesite for decomposition is
that we have identified the structure of the artefact, i.e. its components and their
interaction. However, we argue that there is no unique structure of the artefact.
There are many different structures, and each structure depends on the view we
take on an artefact. The oftware engineer has a different view than the power
engineer or the mechatronics expert. What views can be taken is for the greatest
part education, and to some extent also creativity.
We go one step further, and see that structure is not necessarily a property
of an artefact. By taking a view on an artefact we impose the structure on it.
For example, when we identify the processes running on a system, there is often
not a unique solution, we can choose the borders between processes in different
ways. Some structures of an artefact we cannot see at all, because we have not
learnt to see them.
Taking a view on an artefact, we add something to the artefact. Subsequently,
we can decompose according to the stucture we identified. There are views that
allow for more suitable, or compact, or intuitive decompositions.
Taking a certain view on an artefact abstracts at the same time from all
other views. When we draw a electric circuit, we abstract from the colour of the
resistors.
Modelling works along the identification of components, their interactions,
ie. causalities, and the assumptions we have about them. When we model a
system we need different views. Some causalities and assumptions can be identi-
fied within one view and decomposition, sometimes we need different views. An
example of the single-view is a recipe-based decomposition. There we extract
the information what are the basic (processing-)steps to take, what is their or-
der and what timing requirements are there. An example of the multi-view is a
recipe-based decomposition in combination with an instrumental decomposition:
when we see that two basic (processing-)steps need the same instruments, we
can derive a mutual exclusion requirement for these two basic (processing-)steps.
There is a long list of possible decompositions, or views, among them: func-
tional, service-based, process-based, recipe-based, workpiece-based, instrumen-
tal, communication-based, and event-based decompositions. Moreover, different
views can be mixed within one decomposition. For the moment, the decompo-
sitions mentioned here are vague, they are meant only for illustration of the
number of possibilities. When elaborating a modelling method we need more
precise definitions.
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In which mathematical domain do we describe our model? By having
concentrated on verification models we have to represent the model in some for-
mal language, in contrast to, e.g., natural language descriptions. Still, the number
of possible formal representations is huge. The choice of a suitable mathematical
domain is ideally guided by the answers on the previous questions, and related to
the expressivness of this domain, respectively the formal language correspond-
ing to it. In practice, often a formal language is chosen, because it is the input
language of a powerful tool, or, a language is chosen, because we are familiar
with it. Ideally, we make the choice of the formal language to describe the model,
discussing alternatives and the consequences of our choice to the purpose of the
model, structure we want to express, and the epistomological criteria that have
to be satisfied.
What idealizations and simplifications are applied? We often have the
case that we idealise the behaviour in a model: e.g. messages arrive at a certain
point in time, whereas in the system messages arrive during an interval. Then,
we (should) have an argument why the properties of the idealised model still say
something about the artefact. (Such an argument can also be formal, e.g. using
equivalence classes.)
When we consider a physical object that we want to model, e.g. a valve,
then, typically, we identify the observable behaviour of a valve and invent a
description of a valve that mimics the same behaviour. A first choice would be
to model a valve as an object with two states, open and closed. Placed in a
bigger context with, e.g. a pipe, the state closed of the valve will be defined to
be in conflict with a state flowing of the pipe. This may be enough in one certain
context. In another context a more detailed observation may be neccessary:
valves do not open and close instantaneously, and in the opening and closing
phase less amount of fluid passes through than in the completely open state.
If small amounts of the fluid are relevant to consider, we need here a model
addressing differential equations describing the flow. Possibly, we can also opt
for a simplification of differential equations, and possibly we understand that
also differential equations provide only an approximation of the physical process
and we have to decide whether the error of the approximation is acceptable or
not. The choice we take is guided by domain knowledge from, e.g., the chemical
engineer, who knows all about valves. It is related to the epistomological criteria
as it concerns truthfulness, simplicity, and completeness. It is also related to
the purpose of a model, as, e.g., the chemical processes controlled have to be
represented in the model adequately, and finally, it is also related to the object
of modelling, where the level of granularity of modelling is concerned.
4 Systematic model construction
After the preliminary choices for verification described in section 3, a truthful,
minimal, understandable verification model must be constructed. A method to
achieve this has first been illustrated in [22]. Its purpose is
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– to make decisions explicit and to order them systematically, and thus to
break down the arguments used for construction of the verification model into
such small and understandable, logically ordered pieces that these together
give confidence in the truthfulness of the exercise;
– not to go into more detail and not to model a larger part of the artefact than
necessary for the property to be verified;
– to help take decisions not before they are well-understood.
The method is based on the following assumptions:
– The artefact under discussion has been constructed by binding together cer-
tain parts with well-understood properties such that these parts together
bring forward the desired overall property—even if it may be difficult to
recognise these parts without the help of a domain expert.
– Each physical part of the artefact is required to perform its task (com-
mitment) only as long as its environment guarantees certain conditions
like temperature, power supply, and the necessary input (assumption). If
we don’t have good reasons to abstract from such assumptions, we write
specifications as (assumption, commitment) pairs. The specific notation will
depend on the languages used. Below, we shall use the notation ai → ci.
– For each physical part, quantitative knowledge is available about the time it
needs to perform its task and the quantities of volume, current, voltage etc.
it can handle. This means that formulae ai and ci to be found will contain
numbers rather than vague terms like as soon as possible.
Whichever languages, methods and tools are used for formal verification, the
essence of the formal part of verification of embedded systems consists in finding
out by means of computer support whether P,X |= S where S = (A → C), the
specification of the goal, is a formula defining a desired property of the artefact
under discussion, X is a specification of the control program, and P = (a1 →
c1, a2 → c2, ..., an → cn) is a set of formulae specifying something we know about
the physical parts of the artefact that are to be controlled.
A formula, however, cannot directly define a physical phenomenon. The se-
mantics of a formula defines a mathematical object, which hopefully corresponds
somehow to the intended physical phenomenon. We reserve the term specifi-
cation of a physical phenomenon for a formula that defines a truthful (“repre-
sentative” in the sense of [9]) mathematical model of that phenomenon. Finding
a verification model for an embedded system means finding specifications P,X
and S.
(1) S, the specification of the goal or of the property to be verified, is the
first problem. Essentially, there are three possibilities:
1. S is given, for example because the embedded system under discussion is
part of a bigger artefact, the design of which requires S. Example: “Each
message sent must arrive after at most 100ms” just because otherwise the
surrouding system would fail to work.
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2. Only a vague idea around the goal is given (“Produce fresh coffee asap”),
but the specific implementation determins the quantities (“one cup of 80cc
per minute”). In order to formulate a provable S we must somehow extract
knowledge about implementation choices.
3. Only a vague idea around the goal is given, but we are content with the
verficiation of very general properties (like “Each message must arrive even-
tually.” or “If something is produced, it must be coffee.”) Without extra
knowledge, such specifications are purely academic, as in practice there is no
difference between “eventually” and “not yet, and may be not in the next
hundred years”. Verification of such a general S, however, can be meaningful
in front of a background of exra knowledge, which should always be clearly
stated for start. For example: “We have good reasons to assume that, if a
message arrives at all, it will arrive soon enough. In this verification problem
we only want to focus on construction faults that lead to infinite loops.” or
“If the machine produces something at all, it will be a cup per minute fair
enough. We only want to exclude that soup powder gets into the coffee due
to a control fault.”
(2) P, the specification of the plant, machine, or vehicle in which the
control is embedded, is a much bigger problem. Usually we have a large,
complex physical artefact together with some informal diagrams and descriptions
and, in the best case, domain experts that are willing to help with their nowlegde.
Our method aims at deriving P = (a1 → c1, a2 → c2, ..., an → cn) together with
S in a systematic way, where the a1 → c1 are (hopefully simple) assumptions and
commitments for a (hopefully small) number of constituing parts of the artefact.
(Example: A mechanical wrist watch can better not be considered as lots of
tooth wheels, springs and other strange contraptions; it should be understood
as consisting of an oscillator with frequency 5 Hz, a source of mechanical energy,
three hands, and a mechanism to bring the frequency of an oscillator down to
1/(60*5), 1/(60*60*5), and 1/(12*60*60*) of its value, respectively.)
(3) X, the specification of the control program, can then be understood
as the unknown variable in P,X |= S. If the control program already exists, it
is tempting to use it—or rather its denotational semantics—as its own specifi-
cation. But verification of a large program w.r.t. P and S will usually be far too
complex for contemporary tools. If we find a specification X just strong enough
to ensure P,X |= S we can first prove this and then verify the program against
X independently of its environment: the well-understood question of program
correctness.
The method step by step. We will use a washing machine as running example.
The verification problem is: will the control program switch on and off the various
engines and operate the various valves in such a way that the result is reasonably
clean and dry?
Start from C0 - a simple, general version of the property to be verified.
A formula (depending on the language used) that says: “Clean clothes, at any time,
immediately!”. We know that we mean “as soon as possible”, but that will not be
expressible in most specification languages.
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Use expert knowlegde about the artefact to identify a sub-process that somehow
contributes to this goal.
An obvious choice is: move the clothes in warm water with a detergent.
For that process, find a component in the physical artefact that is used to perform
it.
In our example, this will be a tumbler together with its engine.
For this component, write a formula a1 → c1 that contributes to C0 but does
not contain more knowledge than necessary to contribute to the overall goal.
If clothes, warm water and a detergent are in the tumbler in the beginning, and if
the engine is powered for a certain period, the clothes will be rather clean - and wet
- in the end. At this moment we may realise that we forgot to require sufficiently
dry clean clothes in C0.
Obtain knowledge about the quantities the component requires and can handle;
incorporate these in a1 → c1.
This is the moment to decide whether we are modelling a household washing ma-
chine of a professional one. In casu, no more clothes than 4.5 kg can be handled,
and the process will require 30l of water of 60C and last one hour if it has to re-
move 99% of the dirt. The c1 will also tell us that there is a lot of dirty water te be
disposed of, and that the clothes are wet.
Decide what of the a1 will be ensured by another component of the artefact and
what has to be provided by the environment of that artefact.
In our example the warm water will be provided by a built-in heater, while electricity
and detergent will have to be provided by the environment.
Decide what of the c1 will have to be dealt with by another component.
As we want rather dry clothes, we need some kind of spin-dryer and a pump. The
necessary drain we shall require form the envorinment.
Replace C0 by a weaker A1 → C1 that reflects the new state of knowledge.
A1 will require a certain amount of electricity and detergent as well as drains. C1
will contain the quantities 4.5 kg, 1 hour, and 99%.
Now look at one of the processes that were discovered during the previous step
to decrease the “difference” between a1 → c1 and A1 → C1. Specify it in the
same way as a2 → c2.
For example, we will find a heater that provides warm water provided it gets cold
water and a certain amount of electrical energy.
Adapt A1 → C1 accordingly, which gives us A2 → C2.
A2 is stronger than A1: cold water and more electricity is required. C2, however, is
weaker: even more time is taken.
Continue this method, adding new processes and their system components until
you arrive at a provable: a1 → c1, a2 → c2, ..., an → cn |= An → Cn.
In our example, only a pump has to be added. The tumbler, together with its engine
powered with a higher voltage and with the pump will do the job.
Not before we have obtained this complete picture, we start with the difficult
part of conflicting resources. The specification of one of the processes in our
example requires that the water stays in the tumbler for a certain period, while
the specification of another one requires it to be pumped out while no new water
streams in. A physical tumbler cannot implement both specifications unless it
has valves that can be opened and closed. Likewise, engines and pumps must
have switches to activate and deactivate them.
Adapt the ai of all processes so that they inlude the settings of the necessary
valves and switches, giving a∗i.
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The process pumping the water out of the tumbler, for example, will require the tap
to be closed, the drain to be pened and the pump to be switched on.
From these adapted specifications, An → Cn can no longer be proved. This is
where the control program comes in:
Find a specification X such that a∗1 → c1, a∗2 → c2, ..., a∗n → cn, X |=
An → Cn
This may involve a scheduling problem, requiring further weakening of An →
Cn: the overall process may take more time because conflicting sub-processes
cannot be executed in parallel.
5 Conclusion
Applications The method proposed here has been challenged in a course in
applied formal logic for several years. In the years before our method was taught,
the students were mainly trying to model everything they could think of, in order
“not to forget anything that might be relevant”, until they got completely lost.
Since the method is taught, we can read in many reports that the main insight
they got during the course is to systematically leave away the irrelevant and
formalise only a minimum.
Elements of the method have also been applied in different cases studies, each
of which focussed on a certain aspect. In [14] an academic chemical batchplant
was modelled and verified. Non-monotonic refinement was used here to construct
the model, proofs have been performed with PVS [1]. The case described in [10] is
a real-time token protocol. The focus here was on the the explicitness of criteria
from the taxonomy section, and Uppaal [2] was used for verification. For [15] a
PLC controlled Lego sorter was modelled and verified with Uppaal. The main
issue there is the identification of assumptions during model construction.
Future Work The taxonomy should be extended by more concrete examples
focussing on identified classes of problems. It should have a cookbook form of
lists with possible decisions, corresponding modelling solutions and potential
faults that are introduced when taking the wrong decisions. The taxanomy has
to be evaluated and improved in further cases studies.
The modelling elements discussed in this paper can be used for both, a-
priori and a-posteriori verification. Here, we restricted to the a-posteri case,
assuming that the control specification of code is given. In current research it is
elaborated how control design can be done using these principles. Additionally,
more different decompositions of the embedded system are needed in order to
make restrictions to the control explicit.
The method described here is independent of a specific verification formalism,
method, or tool. IT professionals used to a particular tool but unfamiliar with
the methodological view taken here may need an instantiation of the method
with their familiar notation and terminology.
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